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Dr. Thomas Weyrauch: Two speeches at the
3rd World Conference of Chinese Studies
Witten University Aug. 24th/25th, 2019
Aug. 24th: Tsai Ing-wens Foreign Policy (Abstract).
After the civil war between the Republic of China (ROC) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who created the People´s Republic of China (PRC), tensions between the two Chinese states remained, but both agreed that there was only one subject of international law, One China. Since the 1970s the ROC has lost many diplomatic partners to the PRC. The détente in the Taiwan-Straits created a semi-official approach between the ROC and the PRC through the 1992 Consensus on One China with different interpretation that brought a basis for relaxation. After a short time of warming ties president Chen Shui-bian took the cross-straits relations back to the ice age. When president Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008 the first airplanes crossed the Straits, followed by a boom of intra-China flights, years of peace through the exchange over the Taiwan Straits and a diplomatic truce. Since Ms. Tsai Ing-wen became president in 2016, she decided for a policy of Taiwanization, rejected the adoption of the 1992 consensus, agitated against the idea of One China and opted for the danger of exclusion, confrontation and isolation. There are only a few diplomatic partners left and a real support by the USA in times of need is not likely. The climax of that confrontation can lead to war.
蔡英文外交政策(摘要)
建立中华人民共和国的中国共产党与中华民国内战后至今,两个中国政权之间的紧张关系未解。尽管如此,双方均认同国际法上的主体中国只有一个,亦即法理“一中”。自20世纪70年代以来,许多邦交国背弃中华民国而转向承认中华人民共和国。 1992年因海峡两岸情势逐渐融冰,促成半官方式接触,因此创造出“一个中国,各自表述”的“九二共识”,奠定了舒缓局势的基础。两岸关系短暂回暖之后,陈水扁前总统再度将局势带回冰河期。 2008年马英九总统赢得政权后,民航班机得以首次横越台湾海峡,后续两岸之间不断频繁通航。透过双方各种交流随之而来的是将近十年的和平共处与外交休兵。蔡英文女士2016年当选总统以来,定调实施“台湾化”政策,拒绝接受“九二共识”。她鼓动反对“一中“理念,选择了反中,抗中和锁国台湾的险境。台湾邦交国所剩无几,期待美国在台湾有难时会提供付诸行动的支援无异妄想。上述对立冲突的极致将可能导向战争灾难。
Aug. 25th: The Perception of PRC´s Minor Parties
in Western News Media and Literature (Abstract)
The PRC´s eight minor political parties are committed to the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party and are linked to it in the United Front. For Western journalists and scientists it is surprising that parties even accept the leadership claim of another party. Another aspect is the lack of competition among each other as well as the option of the members to belong to several parties at the same time. An interesting question is the party funding. Older publications claim that the CCP is financing the smaller parties. A common claim is that the eight smaller parties are likely to recruit members only to a limited extent. In addition it is said, they have no right to decide political matters, but only an opportunity to submit proposals to the CCP. The individual parties’ share of representatives in the parliaments of cities, districts, provinces and at the national level are hardly ever indicated. Also, the news media and the literature report little on the number of members and their growth. No Western publication explores the informal or subformal relationships of the smaller parties in the context of the United Front. Those selected facts lead to an inaccurate evaluation.
中华人民共和国的八个小政党完全服从处在领导地位的中国共产党，并且与其同属“联合阵线”。作为一个政党毫无异议的接受他党自称拥有领导权，此种现象令西方国家记者与学术人士甚感讶异。此外令他们不解之事是政党之间不存在竞争关系，一人可同时加入不同政党成为多党党员。再一个令人玩味的事物是政党金源。 早期出版的书刊文物宣称中共持续提供各小党财经支援，咸认因此八个小党只招收限额党员。 此外， 据传该八个小党无权表决政治议题， 只能对中共提供建言。
不论在地方各级人民代表大会或是全国人民代表大会，各别小党的党代表席次占比几乎不为人知。同样地，新闻媒体及专書鲜少报道各小党党员人数或党员增长数据。迄今尚无任何西方出版文物探究过小党与“联合阵线”非正式或半官方的联系关系。这种种经过筛选的少数讯息便导致不精准之评估结果。